Institut für Philosophie

Institut für Philosophie

Navigation und Suche der Universität Osnabrück



Dr. des. Andrea Robitzsch, (née Kruse)


Tel.: +49 541 969-7114

Publikationen (Auswahl)

Andrea Robitzsch (née Kruse)

Aufsätze und Rezensionen

  • Kruse, A. & Wansing, H. (2016): Introduction to the special issue “Doxastic Agency and Epistemic Responsibility”. Synthese, 1-5 (online first).
  • Kruse, A. (2015): Why doxastic responsibility is not based on direct doxastic control. Synthese, 1-32 (online first).
  • Kruse, A. (2015): Nikolaj Nottelmann – Blameworthy belief. A study in epistemic deontologism. Erkenntnis, 80, 675-680.
  • Kruse, A. (2013): What are Epistemic Duties?. In: Hoeltje, M., Spitzley, T. & Spohn, W. (eds.): What may we believe? What ought we to do? Proceedings of GAP.8, the Eighth International Conference of the Society for Analytic Philosophy, pp. 340-351. 
  • Kruse, A. (2011): Puzzles about Peer Disagreement. A Deontological Solution. In: Jäger, C. & Löffler, W. (Hrsg.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34 th  International Wittgenstein Symposium. Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 157-159.


  • How to be an epistemic consequentialist? (Or how we learned not to be a mad mad dog reliabilist), GAP.9, Universität Osnabrück, September 2015.
  • How can believed defeaters be neutralized?  Workshop: Defeaters, Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat, Universität zu Köln, Juni 2015.
  • Die epistemische Bedeutung von Peer Dissens.  Workshop: Epistemischer Relativismus und Peer Dissens, Technische Universität Dresden, Mai 2015.
  • Worauf basiert epistemische Verantwortlichkeit?  Mittelbaukolloquium des Instituts für Philosophie, Universität Duisburg-Essen, Juli 2014.
  • What is epistemic responsibility based on?  Workshop: Doxastic Agency and Epistemic Responsibility, Ruhr Universität Bochum, Juni 2014.
  • An externalist approach to epistemic blameworthiness. Workshop: Responsibility -- The Epistemic Dimension, VU University Amsterdam, April 2014.
  • Epistemic Internalism without ACCESS?, Comment on Duncan Pritchard at the 8th Cologne Summer School in Philosophy, Cologne, September 2013.
  • Combining Epistemic Blameworthiness with Compatibilist Doxastic Control, Comment on Matthias Steup at the workshop Doxastic Freedom and Normativity, Regensburg, September 2013.
  • The Diachronic Dimension of Peer Disagreement, Congress on Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent, September 2013.
  • Was sind epistemische Pflichten?, GAP.8, Konstanz, September 2012.
  • Notes on rational 'ought' implies 'can', Cologne Summer School in Philosophy, Köln, Juli 2012.
  • Der Begriff der epistemischen Verantwortung und die Möglichkeit rationalen Dissenses, Philosophisches Kolloquium des Instituts für Philosophie der Technischen Universität Dresden, Juni 2012.
  • Is Rational Peer Disagreement Possible? Research Colloquium: Philosophy meets Cognitive Science. Recent Debates, Ruhr Universität Bochum, Januar 2012.
  • Puzzles about Peer Disagreement. A Deontological Solution. 34. Internationales Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, August 2011.